

than it had before, nor the flame of a candle than the extinguished snuff or tallow of it; the difference between them being only in the agitation of the insensible parts. We might also add, that, according to this hypothesis, the souls of animals could not be numerically the same throughout the whole space of their lives; since that fire, that needs a pabulum to prey upon, doth not continue always one and the same numerical substance. The soul of a new-born animal could be no more the same with the soul of that animal several years after, than the flame of a new-lighted candle is the same with that flame that twinkles last in the socket; which, indeed, are no more the same than a river or stream is the same at several distances of time. Which reason may be also extended further to prove the soul to be no body at all, since the bodies of all animals are in a perpetual flux, xxxvin. We have now sufficiently performed our first task, which was to shew, from the origin of the Atomical physiology, that the doctrine of incorporeal substance must needs spring up together with it. We shall, in the next place, make it manifest, that the inward constitution of this philosophy is also such, that whosoever really entertains it, and rightly understands it, must of necessity admit incorporeal substance likewise. First, therefore, the Atomical hypothesis, allowing nothing to body, but what is either included in the idea of a thing impenetrably extended, or can clearly be conceived to be a mode of it, as more or less magnitude, with divisibility, figure, site, motion, and rest, together with the results of their several combinations, cannot possibly make life and cogitation to be qualities of body ; since